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CRIMINAL LAW CASE NOTES AND COMMENTS
accompanying values, there is a direct challenge
presented by the newly-devised reciprocal
procedure. In and of itself the Act is no panacea.
However, it does represent a reasonable effort
to alleviate one of the more troublesome areas
of the enforcement of rights and duties across
state lines. Therefore, now that the law-
makers have acted, it is incumbent upon law
enforcement officials and the judiciary to
energize the Act's provisions and to afford a
realistic protection to the individual rights
which it seeks to protect. To this end it is
manifest that the utmost co-operation, coupled
with a good-faith effort to understand the
problems of a collaborating official, is necessary
to insure the successful operation of the
URESA.
The following bibliography, containing citations
to articles, notes and comments relating to re-
ciprocal legislation in the field of non-support, is
offered as a research aid to law enforcement officials
who become involved in litigation under one of the
uniform acts.
5 ALA,. L. REv. 228 (1953). LEE, Alabama's
Reciprocal Nonsupport Legislation.
37 A.B.A.J. 93 (1951). BROCKELBANK, The Prob-
lem of Family Support: A New Uniform Act
Offers a Solution.
3 Am. J. Conp. L. 543 (1954). COMMENT, The
United Nations Draft Conventions on Main-
tenance Claims.
42 A.L.R.2 768 (1955). Anno., Support-Reciprocal
Enforcement.
5 ARK. L. REv. 349 (1951). BROCKELBANK,
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Act.
33 B.U.L. REv. 217 (1953). Comment, he Uni-
form Enforcement of Support Act in Massa-
chusetts.
16 BROOKLYN L. RE:v. 104 (1949). (Short commen-
tary on the Uniform Support of Dependents
Law).
41 CALiF. L. REv. 106 (1953). CONTIN, Inter-
national Enforcement of Maintenance Obliga,
lions.
42 CALIF. L. REv. 382 (1954). EHRENZIVEIG,.
Interstate Recognition of Support Duties.
CuPRiu Tpmms i STATE LEGISLATION 164.
(1952), VoN OrrERSTADT, Reciprocal Support
Legislation.
67 HAmv. L. REV. 1435 (1954) (Casenote on;
Commonwealth v. Mong.).
45 ILL. L. REv. 252 (1950). Comment, The New
Uniform Support of Dependents Act.
17 Mo. L. REv. 1 (1952). BROCKELBANK, IS the
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Act Constitutional?
29 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1480 (1954) (Casenote on
Commonwealth v. Mong).
29 N.C.L. REv. 423 (1952)(Short commentary on
passage of initial act in North Carolina).
31 ORE. L. REv. 97 (1952). BRocKIELANK, Is the'
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Act Constitutional?
2 ST. Louis U.L.J.12 (1952). BROCKE.MANK,
Multiple-State Enforcement of Family Sup-
port.
1 So. TExAS L.J. 144 (1954). TASER, Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Law:.
Like Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Law.
5 SYR. L. REv. 275 (1954)(Casenote on Com-:
monwealth v. Mong).
25 TEMP. L.Q. 336 (1952). Comment, The Uniform
Support Law.
26 TEmp. L.Q. 223 (1953). RuTHERFORD, Pennsyl-
vania's Uniform Support Law.
29 TuL. L. REv. 512 (1955). CRIFIELD, Current
Status of Reciprocal Support Acts.
23 U. CiN. L. REv. 75 (1954). Comment, The
New Reciprocal Non-Support Act.
3 U. KAN. L. REv. 44 (1954). Comment, The ';
Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support
Act.
[19521 Wis. L. REV. 544. Comment, Nonsupport
Laws in Wisconsin.
Woman's Home Companion, Sept. 1949. Wood-
bury, Runaway Husbands.
8 Wyo. L.J. 237 (1954). Comment, The Uniform-
Enforcement of Support Act in Wyoming
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
Modification of Sentence on Court's Own Federal penitentiary. Such a sentence would
Motion-In a proceeding in the United States have enabled the defendant to be released after
District Court' for the Southern District of 48 months upon good behavior, following which
California the defendant pleaded guilty to he would be undei supervision for an additional
robbery and was sentenced to five years in the period of 12 months. While incarcerated in the
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Federal prison a warrant of arrest was issued
by a California magistrate at the request of
local authorities. The warrant was then for-
warded to the warden of the Federal prison and
held as a detainer against the prisoner. The net
effect of such a detainer is to foreclose the possi-
bility of parole and other rehabilitory measures.
When informed of these facts, the federal dis-
trict judge, Judge Tolin, who had sentenced
the prisoner wrote to both the Chief of Police
and the District Attorney of Los Angeles,
explaining to them his position in the matter
and requested that they reconsider their action
and remove the detainer. After receiving no
reply from the Chief of Police and an unsatis-
factory reply on a form letter from the office of
the District Attorney, Judge Tolin reopened
the case on his own motion. United States v.
Candelaria, 131 F.Supp. 797 (S.D.Calif. 1955).
In his opinion, Judge Tolin recognized that
the "two sovereignties" concept has been held
to be constitutional and to permit punishment
of the same person for the same crime by both
federal and state governments. See United
States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377 (1922). However,
he noted that this concept follows merely the
letter and not the spirit of the Constitution and
the common law. In further examining the
California Constitution and statutes he ex-
pressed the opinion that the law of California
itself bars a subsequent prosecution in state
courts after conviction in a federal court. How-
ever, since the action of issuing the detainer was
taken by state authorities he assumed for the
purpose of the case that an actual prosecution
would follow the prisoner's release from the
Federal prison.
Aside from the deleterious effect which a de-
tainer has upon effective rehabilitation, Judge
Tolin also posed the problem of whether the
action taken by the District Attorney was not a
judicial rather than an executive function in
that it "will alter the entire course of treatment
of the prisoner and keep him from receiving
much of what the sentencing Judge intended
when the length of term was prescribed." In
view of all these considerations, Judge Tolin
concluded: "Since local officials have obstructed
Federal efforts to properly punish and correct,
they may pursue the prosecution they have
commenced by their Detainer. The Clerk will
present a modified judgment, fixing the term of
imprisonment at sixty days."
Felony-Murder Rule Applied-The de-
fendant perpetrated an armed robbery of a
dry-cleaning store, knocking out the owner
before leaving. Approximately four to six
minutes elapsed before the owner regained con-
sciousness and called a police officer who was
standing nearby. Sighting the defendant, the
officer gave chase during which defendant shot
and killed his pursuer. Defendant was in-
dicted for felony murder. Appealing from a con-
viction of murder in the first degree the de-
fendant argued that he could not be guilty of a
felony murder since the robbery which he had
admittedly committed was consumated prior
to the time when the pursuit began. The Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia held
that a robbery is in progress so long as asporta-
tion continues and that asportation continues
until the robber reaches a place of seeming
security. The question of whether or not a
robbery is still in progress is one of fact for the
jury. In this case the finding of the jury that
the robbery was still in progress was supported
by the evidence. Carter v. United Stales, 223
F.2d 332 (D.C.Cir. 1955).
Corroborative Circumstances Established by
Prosecutrix' Testimony Held Sufficient to
Sustain Conviction for Rape-The United
States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia recently liberalized its rule that no
person can be convicted in a prosecution for
rape on the basis of the prosecutrix' testimony
alone. In Walker v. United States, 223 F.2d 613
(D.C.Cir. 1955), the court affirmed a rape con-
viction in a case in which the sole testimony
relating to the identity of the accused and the
element of penetration by force was elicited
from the prosecutrix. Although the court stated
that it would continue to adhere to the minority
rule requiring extrinsic corroborative evidence
of the prosecutrix' testimony, followed in
Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Nebraska and New York,
it indicated that circumstances disclosed in the
testimony of the prosecutrix are of themselves
sufficient to fulfill the requirement of circum-
[Vol. 46
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stantial corroboration. In addition, the fact
that the direct testimony of the prosecutrix
remained unshaken upon cross-examination
and also the evasive attitude of the defendant
who testified in his own behalf were considered
as corroborative circumstances tending to
support the direct testimony of the prosecutrix.
A vigorous dissent by Judge Bazelon took
the position that the majority opinion was a
departure from the settled rule in the District
of Columbia, and, in effect, an adoption of the
majority rule that no corroborative evidence is
required unless the prosecutrix' story is in-
herently unbelievable or directly controverted
by other evidence. Judge Bazelon was of the
opinion that corroborative evidence, offered
by the prosecution in addition to the testimony
of the prosecutrix, must be introduced as to
both the corpus delecti and the identity of the
accused. Absent corroboration on these two
points there can be no conviction as a matter
of law, according to the dissenting opinion.
Denial of Defendant's Right to Assistance of
Counsel Renders Conviction Void-In 1939 the
petitioner pleaded guilty to an indictment for
mail theft in a federal court. In 1950 he pleaded
guilty to attempted burglary in a New York
state court' and was sentenced as a second
offender. In 1952 he applied to a federal district
court for a writ of error coram nobis on the
ground that the 1939 conviction was void in
that he was not advised of his right to counsel
nor represented by counsel at that time. From
a denial of the writ he appealed to the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit which reversed
the district court. "Under the Sixth Amend-
ment (as distinguished from the Fourteenth), a
defendant's right to the assistance of counsel in
a criminal trial is an absolute constitutional
requirement.... A conviction in a case where
the defendant has not enjoyed that funda-
mental right is void." Accordingly the sentence
imposed in the state court upon the petitioner
should not have been of the severity usually
awarded to a second offender. To "wipe out the
record of conviction [in the federal court] and
its consequences" a writ of error coram nobis
will issue. United States v. Morgan, 222 F.2d 673
(2d Cir. 1955).
Evidence of Prior Similar Transactions-The
defendant was charged with forgery and during
the course of the trial posited his defense
primarily on the ground that he had signed
another person's name to a promissory note
with that person's authority. During the course
of the trial the prosecution introduced into
evidence over objection of the defendant three
other documents of a similar nature executed
shortly before the note in issue was executed.
Counsel for the defendant argued that since the
defendant admitted the signing that the only
issue was whether he had done so with br
without authority. Upoh conviction of the
crime of forgery the defendant prosecuted an
appeal-to the Court of Appeals of New York.
The court held that where evidence of other
crimes "is relevant to-negative the existence of
accident or mistake, or to show the intentor
motive with which the defendant acted, 6r; a
common scheme or plan, its probative value is
deemed to outweigh the danger of prejudice,
and the rules dictating exclusion will yield."
As to the defendant's theory that his admission
of the signing renidered evidence of similar
transactions inadmissible, the court held that
such an admission merely required that the
trial judge instruct the jury to consider the
evidence solely in relation to the question of
intent to defraud. People v. Dales, 127 N.E.2d
829 (N.Y. 1955).
Failure to Verify Original Petition for Extra-
dition does not Void Subsequent Extradition
Issued Pursuant to the Petition-The Governor
of Georgia filed a petition of extradition with
the Governor of Ohio who issued a writ of ex-
tradition in response to the petition. In a
habeas corpus proceeding the parties named in
the writ challenged the validity of the writ on
the ground that the petition was not verified by
affidavit as required by both Georgia and Ohio
law. The Court of Appeals of Ohio, Mont-
gomery County, held that since the original
petition and the writ issued pursuant thereto
conformed to the requirements set out in 18
U.S.C. §662 that the extradition issued by the
Goyeror of Ohio was valid. ".... [W]hen the
federal and state laws are not the same, the
law of this state [must] give way." The essential
1955]
CRIMINAL LAW CASE NOTES AND COMMENTS
elements in a requisition -for extradition under
-he Federal law are set forth as being: (1) a
demand for a certain person charging him with
.being a fugitive from justice;.-(2) enclosure of
certified copies of the indictments charging
felonies; and, (3) certification by the petitioning
.gqvernor of the indictments as authentic.
.5.,qfe of Ohio v. Smith, 127 NE.2d 633 (Ohio
,1pp 953).
. .ght to De Novo Determination of Physical
PCercion of Confession on Petition of Writ of
.HAabeas Corpus after State Court Conviction-
:Plaintiff was tried and convicted in a state
court. In that court he introduced evidence
that his written confession should be excluded
bcaus.e it was obtained by physical coercion.
Ne.ertheless the court admitted- the confession
And .instructed the jury to consider it only if it
ha. been made voluntarily.-Following his con-
.yiction plaintiff petitioned the district court for
a writ of habeas corpus supporting the petition
yjih. evidence of physical coercion.
:Defendant state contended that the federal
.co.urt had no right to retry the. question and
eyepn:if it had, plaintiff had not proved that the
jury - considered the confession in convict-
ing him.
, The district court granted the writ and the
.Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.
,The court declined to follow the similar case of
Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1953) because it
.involved mental and not physical coercion, but
.held on the.basis of Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S.
433-(1952), construing 28 U.S.C. §§2241 and
2254, that where a constitutional claim is in-
volved a prisoner either in state or federal
custody has the right to have an independent
determination made of his" petition for a writ
of habeas corpus. On the second contention the
cout held that it would not inake the plaintiff
Orove that the jury had considered -his con-
fession in convicting him as that was a burden
im6ssible to discharge. Moreover, as the dis-
trict court found that the confession was
physically coerced, the Court of Appeals was
bound to issue the writ regardless of whether
.the jury did or did not consider the confession
in convicting the plaintiff. Creanor v. Gonzales,
24 U.S.L. WEEx 2109 (9th .Cir. Aug. 22, 1955).
Admissibility of Hospital Record of Results
,of. Chemical Test for Intoxication-The de-
fendant was convicted of driving while under
the influence of intoxicating liquor. During the
course of the trial results of a chemical test of
his blood were admitted into evidence over
objection of the defendant's counsel. On appeal
from the conviction, the appellate court held
that a report purporting to show, the results of a
blood test, in order to be admissible, "must be
shown to come from proper custody and to be an
authentic record." Although a police officer had
testified as to the custody and authenticity of
the hospital report, the court held -that such
testimony was inadmissible as hearsay. How-
ever, in the instant case, the error was not
deemed to be prejudicial since there was other
evidence sufficient to sustain the finding that
the defendant had been intoxicated and the
trial had not been to a jury. People v. Wyner.
142 N.Y.S.2d 393 (Westchester County Ct.
1955).
Georgia Appellate Court D,efines Proper
Foundation for Admission of Mechanical
Transcription into Evidence-In. a civil action
in tort for negligence, counsel for the plaintiff
sought to introduce a Dictaphone recording
containing questions propounded by de-
fendant's counsel and answers by one of de-
fendant's witnesses. In sustaining the ruling of
the trial court excluding the recording, the
appellate court made the following ob-
servations:
"Application of the principles that a proper
foundation must be laid before such evidence as
is here presented, as well as confessions, etc., is
admissible, is elementary and fundamental. In
addition to the principles always applied in
such instances, we have here an additional ele-
ment, i.e., what is. the method of laying the
proper foundation before a Dictaphone record,
tape recording, and similar mechanical trans-
scription devices may be reproduced in the
presence of the jury? ... A proper foundation
for their use must be laid as follows: (1) It
[Vol. 46
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must be shown that the mechanical transcrip-
tion device was capable of taking testimony.
(2) It must be shown that the operator of the
device was competent to operate the device.
(3) The authenticity and correctness of the
recording must be established. (4) It must be
shown that changes, additions, or deletions have
not been made. (5) The manner of preservation
of the record must be shown. (6) Speakers must
be identified. (7) It must be shown that the
testimony elicited was freely and voluntarily
made, without any kind of duress." Steve M.
Solomon, Inc. v. Edgar, 88 S.E.2d 167 (Ga.App.
1955).
